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Sal Paradise Players could steal at will (again, poor Will) off Towers. However, if stealing isn’t a significant offensive weapon then where’s the problem, right?
Stealing is a poor offensive weapon when you have a chance of getting caught. A free base will increase scoring and is NOT insignificant.
This is akin to saying, "If strikeouts aren't so horrible, then why are people so horrified by Brandon Inge's 150 strikeouts?" The reason that Brandon Inge has a problem with strikeouts is because they are outs, of which he already makes a lot.
Put another way—do the ‘suppressed’ runs show up more often in 9-7 games or 3-2 games? The Jays may have scored fewer runs in 2007 by getting the Sal Fasanos, the John McDonalds and the Hector Lunas to move runners along but would it have improved run distribution where it may have gotten them a few more wins?
I honestly don’t know. As I said—there is a disconnect between what I know and what I saw occur during the 2007 season.The studies done on run suppression study the actual results of sacrifices. Since most sacrifices happen in games that are close, the suppression occurs in close games. The stats, therefore, show that even when you only need a couple runs, even if the other team has less than 5 runs, sacrifice bunting doesn't help you out (there are some situations in which it could, but again, they're the vast minority, and sabermetrics would state that in those cases where it raises your probability of winning it's good to go for it).
It is the same in baseball. If the game were so easily predicted based on the cumulative totals of each individual player on the roster with extra weight being given to recent performance there would be no need to play the games. There would be no need for advance scouts since certain approaches will guarantee certain results.
This is a pure unadulterated strawman. Baseball is easier to predict than most other sports because of the large sample sizes and the fact that most events in baseball are discrete. Were you to pick up Curve Ball and read it, I'm sure that you would understand that baseball is anything but easy to predict, because of the massive amount of luck-related variation given probabilities as they are.
Furthermore, your statements about 'predictability' causing a disadvantage if people stick to 'sabermetrics' too closely is preposterous -- if the changing game environment makes never stealing/bunting a negative, then the numbers would indicate that a different strategy would gain better returns, and sabermetrics would be preaching the bunt and stolen bases.
I don't think you understand sabermetrics at all. I don't think you understand statistics. I don't think you've read up on these things, and instead go with what you think sabermetricians mean without actually reading it and thinking about it.
That's the reason that you would be mocked by FJM -- because you don't get it. It's theoretically your job to understand it, and yet you don't.
It's frustrating.
Go pick up Curve Ball. Then go pick up the Baseball Economist. Read both, cover to cover, think about what they're saying, and then please re-evaluate what you think sabermetrics is actually about rather than insulting sabermetrics and yourself by shooting off your mouth without knowledge of what you're saying.
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hilarie Nobody says stolen bases are bad or worth less than any other extra base. Caught stealings are bad. Caught stealings often accompany stolen bases at a rate that cancels out the value of the bases stolen. That was not the case with Henderson and Raines. It is often the case otherwise. This part of your argument makes no sense. The point is that outs and actions that are likely to lead to outs are bad. I don't recall exactly, somebody does, but I think Bill James found the threshold for sb efficiency that makes the strategy a positive contributing factor in the offense. 75%? 80% Something like that. -
tangotiger John, while your prose was excellent, your opinion as to the sabermetric position is not. Hilarie is right that it's not the SB that is bad, but the SB with not good basestealers. The Book gives the break-even point for various inning/score situations. In some cases, the managers don't call for the steal enough. And The Book supports the traditional view of the sac bunt far more than the "new" thinking of the sac bunt. I suggest a reading of The Book. -
studes Ditto. You're sounding more and more like Bill Conlin, John! -
Manhasset Paulie The argument is flawed past your evaluation of the stolen base. You are right that in certain situations (extreme example being tie game bottom of the 9th), a team should be willing to sacrifice maximizing run expectance for the increased probability of scoring one run. Sabermetrics have solved this dilemma by using Win Expectancies instead of Run Expectancies to stamp out the inconsistencies associated with Run Variance/Expectancies.I did find your Josh Towers example interesting. As per Tango, in higher run scoring environments the needed threshold for SB success rate increases. As a result if the windup/stretch splits of a pitcher was extreme enough it may make sense to pitch exclusively from the windup. However, I think this is reason not to dismiss sabermetrics, it simply reflects the fact that there is more work to be done in the field (congers up the 1900 Lord Kelvin quote “There is nothing new to be discovered in physics now. All that remains is more and more precise measurement.")The Book does superb job revisiting areas where traditional sabermetic conclusions are incomplete. Your article reads like a testimonial of questions The Book was written to answer. -
Geoff Young This is anecdotal evidence and a sample size of one, but I remember a few years ago when the Padres' Stan Spencer had trouble pitching from the stretch, he worked exclusively from the windup in a game against the Marlins. They stole 10 bases that evening and lost, 6-2. Sure, it's the 2000 Marlins, but still... it's the 2000 Padres, too. ;-) -
John Brattain Ditto. You're sounding more and more like Bill Conlin, John!
Get off my lawn!!!
Perhaps, but feedback has been a little slow of late ;-)
Best Regards
John
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beitvash I understand the point about the "disconnect," and sabermetrics/statistical analysis does not attempt to address all those "human elements" you're talking about, but I would argue that those human elements are indirectly addressed by evaluating the long-term performance of a player. If a player tends to lose focus, this will be reflected in the numbers. If a player loses focus ONE time and loses one game, this will get lost in the numbers (as it should, because this one event was not truly indicative of the player's performance).
As far as stolen bases and sac bunts go, it is true that sometimes taking a risk in a game can change the outcome, and I would agree that teams and managers should be taking those risks. This is also why we watch the game - despite the reliability of the numbers, it is unpredictable.
There are times to use stolen bases and sac bunts, and I would be willing to buy into the argument that stolen bases and sac bunts can be and are more valuable than we think they are. But if this is the case, there ARE data to back it up, and I would need to see that to be convinced. Statistical analysis is not about winning every game or scoring every run, it's about increasing the probability of winning as many games as possible over a long period of time.
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buddaley I think you are oversimplifying the views of sabermetricians. They are not against steals or sacrifice bunting. They oppose using those tactics automatically instead of when they are most useful. And in fact, in specific instances, they consider it necessary for the manager to decide based on who is the batter, who is on deck, what are the matchups or what is the nature of the team. I also think it is fallacious to assume that sabermetricians ignore the psychological realities.
To me the keys are these. Sabermetricians ask questions and seek rational ways to answer them. In the process, they add to the sum total of our knowledge of how baseball games are won and lost. But they do not-or should not-foster orthodoxy. The whole point is that they attack orthodoxy; by nature, the effort is iconoclastic. They are not replacing traditional views (with some exceptions) but adding to and modifying them.
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John Brattain Seriously though, while some of what I wrote was to get a reaction I think the central point of what I wrote is still being missed. The questions that I wish explored are these: How much value is there in the distraction effect of things like potential stolen bases and potential hit-and-runs and sac bunts.
We know the statistical value of things like the stolen base, SB/CS ratios etc. but is there value above that?
I’m curious about the human element. We know which pitchers have the best fastballs/curveballs/sliders etc. What pitchers are easily distracted and what distracts them? A possible hit-and-run, a burner on first, a potential bunt? Which ones are not bothered by such things? What team's infielders have the best anticipation/reaction when defending plays that are put on? Statistically, what are the most common sources of distraction? What are the most valuable sources for distraction? How can a team employ the most effective and avoid using things that are of minimal distraction.
For example, were I playing a team like the Marlins with the defensively challenged Hanley Ramirez/Dan Uggla or the 2006 Blue Jays that opened the season with a keystone of the inexperienced Russ Adams/Aaron Hill I'd be doing everything within reason to challenge their poise, their reactions, their lack of aptitude etc.
For another example, suppose a team has an older pitcher (37 years old or higher) on the mound and the man playing third is struggling with nagging leg or back problems--would attempting to bunt on the left side of the infield with men on be a better option than swinging away with a league average batter up?
Those are the questions I hope to have answered--the indirect effects that impact run scoring/game situations. We know the raw run value of the stolen base. Now over the course of the season what is the run value of defensive uncertainty/distracted pitching/inexperienced infielders?
Say over the course of a year the SB/CS ratio cost a team five runs. How many runs did the team gain by distracting the pitcher with a man on first? How many more fastballs were thrown because of them? How many more hittable pitches did the baserunner give the guy in the batter's box? How did it affect pitch sequence as opposed to when first base is vacant? How many times did the throwing arm of a catcher cause a pitcher to change his mind as what to throw? Are pitch counts and stamina impacted by throws over to first?
We read about unearned runs--in tennis there is a stat that differentiates between errors and unforced errors; well, how many unearned runs were due to forced errors caused by defensive uncertainty and distraction?
Again--this is the sort of thing about which I’ve wondered. I appreciate the information I’m getting but it isn’t the question I am asking.
Best Regards
John
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walshj58 Hi John,
One of my very first articles for THT was a study on how effective potential basestealers are in disrupting the pitcher and defense. You should read the article if you're interested, but the bottom line is that the fast baserunners don't seem to have any positive effect on the batter, when compared to any baserunner on 1B (having a runner on 1B helps by forcing changes in defensive alignment, but that is true for virtually all baserunners, not only fast ones).
I believe Tango et. al. came to similar conclusions in The Book. Furthermore, there have been studies (maybe Bill James first did this) that when a stolen base is actually attempted during a plate appearance, batters tend to hit worse than they normally do. This is most because, I believe, batters will take an extra pitch or two in that situation, and that degrades their performance.
I know all this goes against conventional wisdom (there's a misnomer for you), but that's what the studies are telling us.
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halejon Read The Book! The short answer is hitters are disrupted by stolen base attempts, too. There are also chapters on other things you mentioned like when and how to leverage the bunt for wins instead of runs and even the game theory behind being too predictable in terms of strategy.
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bernie132000 I thought that sacrifice bunt increases the probability of getting one run, yet decreases the chances of a multi run inning, thus decreasing the expected runs. I would think that late in tied or one run games, that if your goal is to score one run, then you should bunt, but early you should swing for the big inning. If this is wrong, please correct me. -
John Brattain Hmm ... this 'book' of which you speak intrigues me.
I hope the author is a reputable sort.
Best Regards
John
THT: Brattain: These Numbers are Disconnected
BBTF's Baseball Primer Newsblog —
THT: Brattain: These Numbers are Disconnected Death to all Clickers! ...Shove over Capt. Cragis! Sgt. Brattain is the new leader of the Order of Flesh and Blood! It’s not that I’m in the “traditional stathead” camp—far from it. I fully appreciate the importance of on-base percentage and I feel that generally it is a bad idea to give away outs (yet feel there are times when it is necessary), etc. There is, however, a human element to the game that, while it cannot be fully quantified, it has to be taken into account. ...This is why I stand so firmly on the fence when it comes ...
More Stat-o-matics
East Windup Chronicle —
... The article I want to point you in the direction of is in today’s Hardball Times, and is written by one of their regular contributors John Brattain. It’s called These Numbers are Disconnected and tries to make a cohesive, intelligent, argument against the blind use of stats. It seems funny that someone would have to make an argument that there is indeed a human element in baseball, but I suppose this is what its come to. ...
Online Video Report: Sony's Minisodes
Playing for Peanuts Blog —
... . They are useful in that they force you to re-examine everything through a new perspective. Sometimes it works... but sometimes you get some fool telling you that a sacrifice bunt is wrong because you shouldn't "give away outs." Or, in the case of the minisode, sometimes you get five minutes of "Married With Children" and Al Bundy only has a few lines. In short, it looks good on paper, but it sometimes ...
